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1. INTRODUCTION
The transition from hard-wired to computer-based
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems is connected
to various challenges, e.g. the fundamental differences
between hard-wired and computer-based technologies, the
rapid evolution of computer-based technologies, human
interaction issues and hybrid control rooms, qualification
of new technologies and components, protection against
common cause failures, cyber security, and so forth [1].
The focus of this paper is the technology based challenges
affecting the I&C system design, for example, the allocation
of I&C functions to I&C systems and components, imple-
mentation of the defense-in-depth concept [2], and manage-
ment of complexity [3].
The I&C system design is of major importance to
nuclear power plant engineering, because it is responsible
for the transformation of the process related requirements
into adequate I&C system architectures, and hence, the
I&C system design directly contributes to the safety of
nuclear power plants. Therefore, the I&C engineering efforts
must be focused on extensive and thorough I&C system
design activities, which are expressed in the modeling and
analysis of I&C system designs.
Different publications emphasize the relevance of the
I&C system design modeling and analysis in various
contexts: [4] presents an approach for the modeling of
computer-based I&C systems in the context of reliability
analysis for the probabilistic risk analysis, [5] likewise
models I&C systems for the reliability estimation, [6], in
its “3+3 Process” approach, proposes the formal modeling
of software, subsequent code generation, and coverage
analysis, [7] evaluates description languages with respect
to the modeling of CCF and dependencies, [8] considers
the modeling of physical plant processes in order to improve
the control system design, and [9] promotes the model
driven engineering approach for small modular reactors.
The utilization of models in I&C engineering allows for
a more efficient and qualitative engineering process [10],
so that design decisions related to the I&C system design
can be shifted to earlier life-cycle phases, i.e. modeling
enables front-end loading. An important I&C engineering
activity is the analysis of the I&C system models in order
to verify and validate the I&C system dependability, as it
The design of computer-based instrumentation and control (I&C) systems is determined by the allocation of I&C functions
to I&C systems and components. Due to the characteristics of computer-based technology, component failures can negatively
affect several I&C functions, so that the reliability proof of the I&C systems requires the accomplishment of I&C system
design analyses throughout the I&C life-cycle.
On one hand, this paper proposes the restructuring of the sequential IEC 61513 I&C life-cycle according to the V-model,
so as to adequately integrate the concept of verification and validation. On the other hand, based on a metamodel for the
modeling of I&C systems, this paper introduces a method for the modeling and analysis of the effects with respect to the
superposition of failure combinations and event sequences on the I&C system design, i.e. the temporal change of physical
structure is analyzed. In the first step, the method is concerned with the modeling of the I&C systems. In the second step, the
method considers the analysis of temporal change of physical structure, which integrates the concepts of the diversity and
defense-in-depth analysis, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and failure mode and effects analysis.
KEYWORDS : Nuclear I&C, Digital I&C, Life-cycle, Engineering, Modeling, Method, Failure Analysis
653NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/NET.04.2013.010
is, for example, accomplished in [4] and [5]. Several I&C
system analysis techniques are stated in [2], which include
the defense-in-depth and diversity (D3) analysis, fault tree
analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA) and failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA). These analysis techniques
must be adequately aligned with the modeling activities
on one hand, but both I&C engineering activities, i.e. the
modeling and analysis, must also be integrated in the life-
cycle, on the other hand.
Although the detailed analysis techniques encompass
different objectives, they all target proving the dependability,
i.e. availability, reliability, safety, integrity, and maintain-
ability [11], of the I&C system designs. On the contrary,
the dependability of these system designs is threatened
by failures of I&C systems and components, which can
negatively affect required I&C functions, especially due
to the aggregation of several I&C functions on single
components. Therefore, I&C systems must be designed
accordingly, so that failures do not prevent the control of
event sequences challenging the nuclear power plants.
In the scope of this paper, a method for the modeling
and analysis of I&C systems is proposed, which utilizes
the framework provided by the IEC 61513 I&C safety life-
cycle [12] and integrates partial concepts of the following
analysis techniques: D3 analysis, FTA, ETA, and FMEA.
This method is denoted as 2-step modeling approach and
consists of two parts: the modeling of I&C systems and
the analysis of these system models with respect to the
superposition of failure combinations and event sequences,
denoted as TeCoPS analysis. Based on the analysis results,
the I&C system design can be accordingly modified early
in the life-cycle. Moreover, this method contributes to
I&C engineering simplification, due to the utilization of
knowledge-based systems and the consequential partially
automated analysis. The contribution within this paper
builds on the common accomplishment of I&C projects
utilizing the IEC 61513 life-cycle as a framework, and
integrating well-known and accepted analysis techniques.
However, the novelty of the presented concept targets the
support of I&C engineering by introducing the principles
for the utilization of computer-based tools for the I&C
system design analysis. The modeling with the 2-step
modeling approach represents a prerequisite for the genera-
tion of I&C system models; this, on one hand must take
the modeling of temporal change of physical structure into
consideration, and on the other hand must integrate the
formal modeling for the computer supported analysis. On
this basis, the introduced, partially automated TeCoPS
analysis results in a simplified I&C system design analysis
with less effort for I&C engineering, so that human failures
throughout the analysis are prevented.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shortly
presents the metamodel for the modeling of I&C systems,
followed by the discussion about the IEC 61513 I&C safety
life-cycle in section 3, which is additionally adapted to
the V-model. Section 4 introduces the method in which
the initial utilization of the IEC 61513 I&C safety life-
cycle for the modeling is presented, followed by the I&C
system model analysis. The paper is concluded with a
short summary.
2. MODELING OF I&C SYSTEMS
2.1 Metamodel
The basis for the modeling of I&C systems is constituted
by the metamodel shown in Figure 1, which is discussed
in more detail in the authors’ publications [13] and [14].
The metamodel is based on the description language
AutomationML [15], which utilizes the description language
Computer Aided Engineering eXchange (CAEX) [16].
For the presentation of the metamodel in Figure 1, a class
diagram of the Unified Modeling Language [17] is utilized,
where the presentation is limited to classes, and relationships
modeling aggregations and specializations.
The structuring of the metamodel follows the standard
IEC 81346 for the structuring of industrial systems [18],
which yields the three structures to the right of Figure 1: the
product structure1, function structure, and location structure.
The location structure is comprised of the classes for the
modeling of spatial information, the function structure
consists of objectives and I&C system functions, and the
product structure models systems, subsystems, and compo-
nents. These three structures allow for the modeling of the
required I&C system aspects, though as the structures are
solely hierarchical and basically independent from each
other, the modeling is completed by relationships, which
654 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
GÖRING et al., Method for the Analysis of Temporal Change of Physical Structure in the Instrumentation and Control Life-cycle
Fig. 1. Metamodel for Modeling I&C Systems
1 The term product structure emanates from the standard IEC 81346
[18] and has the same meaning as physical structure or I&C system
architecture.
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model the dependencies within and between the structures.
Consequently, the metamodel enables the generation of
comprehensive I&C system models.
2.2 Temporal Change of Physical Structure - TeCoPS
The product structure, function structure, and location
structure allow for the modeling of static I&C system
designs, but the changes due to failures are not considered.
With respect to the stated objective of analyzing I&C system
models, there is the necessity to integrate the modeling of
failure combinations and event sequences in the metamodel,
for which the event structure, shown to the left of Figure 1,
is utilized.
Failures have their origin in the product structure, where
the failure of a component results in the change of the
product structure, though the effects must be analyzed
within the function structure. The focus of the authors’
research is the temporal change of physical structure, i.e.
the product structure, which only changes temporarily and
has its cause in failures and maintenance. This is denoted
as temporal change of physical structure, abbreviated as
TeCoPS (see [14] for more details on TeCoPS).
The event structure allows for the modeling of parallel
and independent event sequences, where successive events
are hierarchically structured, and temporal dependencies
are modeled with attributes. On one hand, the events are
comprised of the capabilities for modeling failures, and
on the other hand, events challenging the nuclear power
plant and I&C systems can be modeled, so that these are
superimposed in the event sequences.
2.3 Modeling TeCoPS Knowledge in a Knowledge-
Based System
In order to adequately support I&C engineering, the
analysis of the TeCoPS effects is automated under the
utilization of the concept of knowledge-based systems
(KBS) [19], which are generally applicable to the engi-
neering of these systems [20]. This requires the formal
modeling of TeCoPS [21], for which the Process Specifi-
cation Language (PSL) [22] is utilized.
The general architecture of KBS is shown in Figure 2.
KBS are composed of the control system and knowledge-
base, where the control system serves as the user interface
and controls the knowledge within the knowledge-base.
The knowledge base consists of case-specific and domain-
specific knowledge. The former represents the knowledge
about a specific I&C system model, in this case generated
utilizing the metamodel, whereas the latter represents the
terminology of the domain under consideration, i.e. the class
knowledge comprising the metamodel and PSL lexicon,
and the rule knowledge, which is utilized for the inference
of new knowledge. The rule knowledge is composed of
the PSL axioms in order to control the consistency with
PSL, general predicates modeling TeCoPS, and rules for
the analysis of the effects of TeCoPS. More details about
the implementation of TeCoPS with PSL and KBS are
presented in the authors’ publication [23].
3. I&C LIFE-CYCLE
The metamodel presented in the previous section is
based on the context of I&C in nuclear power plants and
provides comprehensive modeling capabilities for the
generation of I&C system models. However, in order to
thoroughly support I&C engineering, the metamodel must
be combined with an adequate method for its application
[24]. Moreover, the method must be aligned with the I&C
life-cycle, so as to efficiently exploit the framework of
the life-cycle for front-end loading.
The necessity for life-cycles in general, including life-
cycles for I&C systems, is presented in paragraph 5.1 of
[25], and their importance is emphasized in [2]. In the
scope of international nuclear standards, these life-cycles
are presented in [2] and [12], of which the latter standard,
i.e. IEC 61513, provides more details on the life-cycle
phases. For this reason, the IEC 61513 I&C safety life-
cycle forms the basis of the 2-step modeling approach,
i.e. the method addressed in this publication. 
Before the method is presented in the fourth section,
this section is concerned with the detailed presentation of
the utilized IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle on the basis
of [12] and the restructuring of the life-cycle in order to
emphasize the verification and validation of I&C systems.
3.1 IEC 61513 I&C Safety Life-Cycle
The IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle [12] is two-part
and is composed of the overall I&C safety life cycle and
I&C system safety life-cycles. Each part consists of several,
sequentially structured life-cycle phases, which are com-
prised of different activities and results. The overall I&C
safety life-cycle considers all I&C systems on the plant
Fig. 2. Integration of Knowledge-based Systems and the
Modeling Concept for Automated Analysis
level, whereas the I&C system safety life-cycles solely
concentrate on single I&C systems. Figure 3 shows the
life-cycle phases and activities of the overall I&C safety
life-cycle, supplemented by the relationship to the I&C
system safety life-cycles.
The first phase of the overall I&C safety life-cycle is
concerned with the derivation of I&C requirements from
the plant safety design basis, resulting in the overall I&C
requirements specification. This phase is divided into three
activities, of which each activity considers different parts
of the I&C requirements: functional, performance, and
independence requirements, categorization requirements,
and nuclear power plant requirements.
Based on the overall I&C requirements specification,
the overall I&C system specification can be engineered,
which represents the plant level I&C system design. Within
this life-cycle phase, the activities of I&C architecture
design, allocation of I&C functions to I&C systems, and
required analysis are accomplished. With respect to the
addressed challenges stated in the introductory section of
this paper, this early life-cycle phase is of major importance
to I&C engineering and requires thorough modeling and
analysis of the I&C system design in order to realize the
necessary front-end loading. Once this life-cycle phase is
completed, any changes affect all further life-cycle activities.
Thus, the activity of required analysis is of importance,
for which [2] states the previously addressed analysis
techniques.
The overall I&C system specification is followed by
the I&C system safety life-cycles, where the I&C systems
are designed, realized, and installed. The overall I&C safety
life-cycle follows the I&C system safety life-cycles with
the phase of overall integration and commissioning, which
results in integrated and commissioned I&C systems. As
part of this life-cycle phase, the I&C systems are validated
with respect to the plant level and system level requirements.
The overall I&C safety life-cycle ends with the phase of
operation and maintenance.
The overall I&C system specification serves as the
input information for the I&C system safety life-cycle,
which is shown in Figure 4 and starts with the life-cycle
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Fig. 3. Overall I&C Safety Life-cycle [12]
Fig. 4. I&C System Safety Life-cycle [12]
phase of system requirements specification. In this phase,
the plant level requirements are broken down into system
specific requirements related to the I&C functions, design
constraints, I&C system boundaries, and environmental
conditions.
These requirements are utilized for the I&C system
design represented in the system specification, which
provides information of the components, I&C system
architecture, software requirements and allocation of I&C
functions to components. This life-cycle phase corresponds
to the overall I&C system specification phase and is of
equal importance to I&C engineering. This means that
the subsequent life-cycle phases, i.e. especially the I&C
system realization, depend on the I&C system design
output and I&C engineering must proceed thoroughly.
Based on the I&C system design, the realization of
the I&C system can occur as part of the detailed design,
which is separated into the realization of the hardware
and software. The detailed design phase includes further
required analyses related to the validation of the I&C func-
tions and the reliability analysis. Subsequently, hardware
and software are integrated as part of the system integration
phase, validated as part of the factory acceptance test, and
finally installed in the nuclear power plant, where the
verification and validation of the installed I&C systems
is accomplished. The design modifications represent the
last life-cycle phase, but they are usually considered
throughout the entire I&C life-cycle.
The structure of the IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle
represents a top-down approach, where initially the I&C
systems from the entire nuclear power plant are considered,
followed by the design of separate I&C systems, and on the
lowest level, hardware and software of the components
are realized.
3.2 Structuring of Life-Cycles
In general, life-cycles can be structured differently,
so that their different aspects are emphasized [26]. Basic
structuring approaches are, for example, represented by
the waterfall model and the V-model, which are sketched
in Figure 5.
The IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle, as it is presented
in the previous section, is composed of sequentially struc-
tured life-cycle phases and implements the waterfall model,
which was presented in 1970 in the scope of large software
system developments [27]. Its shape resembles a waterfall,
which illustrates the progressing development process.
Furthermore, [27] identifies the necessity for iterations
between the phases, points out the problem of required
testing within the late life-cycle phases, and states five
principles for minimizing the development risk, e.g. in the
form of thorough documentation. However, the importance
of the verification and validation (V&V) of I&C systems,
so as to adequately prove their dependability, is not reflected
in this structuring approach.
The importance of V&V for nuclear power plants was
stated in the domain’s early years [28] and is also empha-
sized in the present standards, e.g. [2]. A general structuring
approach of life-cycles considering the importance of V&V
is constituted by the V-model [29], where the life-cycle
phases are separated into two parts. The left part of the
V-model represents the top-down design process starting
with the requirements specification and ending with the
realization, whereas the right part illustrates the bottom-
up integration and verification, i.e. its focus is on V&V.
The distinctiveness of the V-model emanates from the
relationships between its left and right parts. Each phase
of the integration and verification part corresponds to
phases of the design part, so that the V&V activities can
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Fig. 5. Basic Life-cycle Structures: the Waterfall Model [27] and V-model [29]
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distinctively revert to the design activities. Nowadays,
the basic V-model structure is integrated into the life-
cycle V-Model XT [30].
3.3 Restructuring of the IEC 61513 I&C Safety Life-
Cycle
This section presents the authors’ proposal of restruc-
turing the IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle according to
the V-model, which is mainly motivated by the integration
of the V&V concept in the life-cycle2. In addition, the
restructuring supplements the alignment of the method with
the life-cycle, so as to utilize the more closely connected
life-cycle phases, and clearly implements an advantageous
top-down decomposition of the I&C systems .
The restructured life-cycle is shown in Figure 63. The
life-cycle phases correspond to the IEC 61513 I&C safety
life-cycle as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, though the
phases are denoted based on their results. Vertically, the
restructured life-cycle illustrates the top-down decom-
position of the I&C systems with respect to the plant level,
system level, and hardware and software level. In other
words, Figure 6 integrates the overall plant level and
system level life-cycles. The left part of the restructured
life-cycle is composed of the I&C system design phases,
whereas the phases to the right are concerned with the
integration and verification. The relationships between the
phases are presented by the arrows, where the life-cycle
progress, verification, and validation are considered.
Verification is the quality assurance activity proving
correct implementation, answering the question of whether
the product is constructed correctly. On the contrary,
validation is the quality assurance activity considering
the correct objective of the implementation, as it proves
whether the correct product is constructed [31]. In both
cases, the reference is represented by the requirements.
Figure 6 illustrates the integration of V&V into the
life-cycle. On one hand, subsequent life-cycle phases are
connected by a required verification, resulting in the input
information of a phase being based on correct information
of the previous phase. On the other hand, V&V is performed
between the life-cycle phases of the left and right parts of
the V-model. The system integration must correspond to the
detailed design, whereas in the phases of system validation
and system installation the system requirements are verified.
This verification solely concentrates on the fulfillment of
requirements, such as the correct software implementation
or installation of the I&C system components4.
Fig. 6. IEC 61513 I&C Safety Life-cycle Restructured According to the V-model
2 This proposal is in line with the structuring of the life-cycle presented in [2] according to the V-model.
3 The numbering of the first life-cycle phases serves the relationship between the life-cycle and method, which is utilised in section 4.
4 For this reason, the life-cycle phase of system validation solely verifies the system requirements.
The validation of the I&C systems is performed at the
plant level under the consideration of all I&C systems, here
the system level and plant level requirements are validated.
This phase is of special importance, as the correct imple-
mentation of the I&C functions and I&C systems are proved,
resulting in a sound basis for the operation.
The restructured life-cycle according to Figure 6 is
utilized as the framework for the 2-Step modeling approach
presented in the following sections, for which the generation
of the I&C system models and subsequent I&C system
design analysis is aligned with the early life-cycle phases.
4. METHOD FOR THE MODELING AND THE
ANALYSIS OF I&C SYSTEM DESIGNS
On the basis of the metamodel presented in section 2
and I&C life-cycle discussed in the previous section, this
section presents the method for the modeling and analysis
of I&C system designs. In general, the method is two-part,
where the first part is concerned with the modeling of the
I&C systems, i.e. the 2-step modeling approach, and the
second part considers the analysis of temporal change of
physical structure, i.e. the TeCoPS analysis.
4.1 2-Step Modeling Approach
The objective of the method for the analysis of I&C
system designs is realizing front-end loading, so that the
I&C systems can be modeled and analyzed as early in the
life-cycle as possible. Consequently, the modeling and
analysis is based on two steps. In a first step, the I&C
systems are modeled and analyzed on the plant level,
followed by the refinement of the modeling and analysis
on the system level. The overview of the 2-step modeling
approach is shown in Figure 7.
To the left of Figure 7, the relevant life-cycle phases
are shown, whereas to the right the life-cycle activities
are presented. The life-cycle phases in Figure 7 are the
same as in IEC 61513 I&C safety life-cycle according to
Figure 6, which is highlighted by the numbering5. The
modeling of the I&C systems in the first step is based on
information of the overall I&C requirements specification
phase (1) and the overall I&C system specification phase
(2). The function structure (a), can be modeled in the
course of the first life-cycle phase (1), because the I&C
functions originate from process engineering and this
information is the input to the entire I&C system design.
Likewise, the location structure (b) can superficially be
modeled, as at least the required buildings and rooms are
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Fig. 7. 2-Step Modeling Approach
5 Throughout the description of the method the reference to the numbering is stated in brackets.
known. The product structure (c) is modeled in the second
life-cycle phase (2), based on the I&C system design
information, i.e. the I&C system architecture. After the
three structures are modeled, the dependencies (d) between
the structures can be modeled, at which the allocation of
the I&C functions to I&C systems is of major importance.
Subsequently, the I&C system designs on the plant level
can be analyzed with respect to the superposition of
failure combinations and event sequences (e), for which
the TeCoPS analysis specified in section 4.3 is utilized.
In dependence of the TeCoPS analysis results, the I&C
system design could require modifications, resulting in
I&C engineering going back to the overall I&C requirements
specification phase (1). This iteration is repeated until the
analysis results are satisfactory, and subsequent I&C engi-
neering activities can build on a solid basis.
On the system level, plant level requirements are broken
down into the system requirements specification (3) as usual,
and the I&C system specification (4) is accomplished. As
part of this life-cycle phase, the entire modeling capabilities
are utilized for the generation of the completed I&C system
models. This includes the life-cycle activities (f) and (g),
as well as the modeling of all dependencies (h) between
the structures. In consequence, the system specification
phase (4) is finished with the second TeCoPS analysis (i).
According to [12], this phase does not comprise of any
analyses, though the TeCoPS analysis is introduced in order
to achieve a solid basis for the detailed design phase (5)
and subsequent I&C system implementation. Likewise,
based on the analysis results, I&C engineering must go
back to the system requirements specification phase (3),
so as to modify the system level designs.
The separation of the modeling and analysis
approach into two parts allows for front-end loading, so
that initially the plant level design can be accomplished and,
if required, modified. This results in sounder I&C system
designs and avoids design changes in late life-cycle phases.
The refinement of the modeling and analysis in a second
step repeats the entire method, though with more detailed
design information. In consequence, the detailed design
can revert to sound I&C engineering, which also affects
the V&V life-cycle phases, because correct, results are to
be expected.
4.2 Existing Analysis Techniques
For the analysis of the I&C system models with respect
to the superposition of failure combinations and event
sequences, existing analysis techniques are integrated in
the TeCoPS analysis. This section briefly presents the
utilized analysis techniques.
4.2.1. D3 Analysis
The diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) analysis is
presented in [32]. Its objective is the analysis of computer-
based I&C systems with respect to common cause failures.
The background and motivation for the D3 analysis is the
inherent susceptibility of computer-based I&C systems to
common-cause failures. The I&C system design utilizes
various design features, e.g. redundancy, independence,
and separation, though the design feature of diversity is
seen as most effective against common cause failures. The
design feature of diversity is separated into six attributes:
design diversity, equipment diversity, functional diversity,
signal diversity, and software diversity, which are seized
and elaborated in [33] for the implementation of diversity
strategies.
For the D3 analysis the I&C systems are initially
modeled based on blocks, which represent black boxes on
the lowest level of I&C system aspects under consideration.
The blocks are differentiated by the diversity attributes,
and failure of the blocks affects all block output signals
equally.
In the course of the D3 analysis, concurrent failures of
the same blocks, i.e. blocks utilizing the same hardware
and software, are postulated, blocks’ output signals are
assumed to fail, and effects of postulated common cause
failures must be manually analyzed by I&C engineering.
The boundary conditions for the analysis are represented
by the plant design basis event sequences challenging the
nuclear power plant and I&C systems.
The D3 analysis is strongly dependent on I&C engi-
neering know-how, as the engineers must determine the
scope of common cause failures to be postulated and rely
on comprehensive information for analysis of the effects.
4.2.2. ETA and FTA
The event tree analysis (ETA) and fault tree analysis
(FTA) are usually applied in combination as part of the
probabilistic safety assessment [34] in order to determine
the core damage frequency.
The objective of the ETA [35] is to represent any kind
of event sequence, and is mostly utilized for the analysis
of abnormal conditions and accidents of technical systems.
The starting point for the ETA is the initial event, e.g. a
component failure, for which the sequential events are
developed until final events are reached, which either
represents a safe or a hazardous state. For each level in
the ETA, the system response in the form of functions is
considered, i.e. the functions either fail or operate, resulting
in the characteristic tree shape. The ETA is completed by
probabilistic values for the events, so that these values
for the final events can be determined.
On the contrary, the FTA’s objective is to determine
the causes of an undesired event [36]. The starting point
for the top-down FTA are the events of the ETA, for which
engineering has to determine the causes based on a compre-
hensive knowledge about the underlying technical system.
The causes are hierarchically decomposed and combined,
yielding different cut sets, i.e. minimal sets of causes,
responsible for the undesired event. The FTA can likewise
be completed with probabilistic calculations in order to
determine systems reliability.
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4.2.3. FMEA
The failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [37] is
a bottom-up approach for the analysis of system failure
effects. As part of the FMEA, engineering postulates
different single failures, and the effects on the operation,
functions, and system states are analyzed. The bottom-up
approach is expressed in a hierarchical decomposition of
the technical system, for which the failures are postulated
on the lowest hierarchy level, and effects are analyzed on
the following levels. Typically the FMEA is accomplished
for single failures, but, for example, [38] and [39] also
consider the FMEA for multiple failures.
4.3 TeCoPS Analysis
The 2-step modeling approach concentrates on the
modeling of I&C systems along the life-cycle, whereas
the TeCoPS analysis represents the life-cycle activities
(e) and (i), which are shown in Figure 7. The TeCoPS
analysis integrates partial concepts of the presented D3
analysis, FTA, ETA, and FMEA, and results in a combi-
nation of bottom-up and top-down analysis approaches. Out
of the existing analysis techniques, the D3 analysis is the
most decisive with its superposition of postulated common
cause failures and event sequences. This approach is ex-
tended to the postulation of single and multiple failures,
so as to encompass the FMEA and ETA/FTA approaches
and model any kind of failure combination. Moreover, the
bottom-up and the top-down approaches of the FMEA
and FTA are combined in order to allow for flexibility in
the analysis, and guarantee for completeness.
Figure 8 shows the overview of the TeCoPS analysis,
of which the highlighted activities are automated and the
remaining activities require I&C engineering effort. Input
information to the analysis of the effects of failure combi-
nations, as shown in the upper part of Figure 8, is the I&C
system model according to the metamodel and the event
sequence models. The former input information represents
the output of the 2-step modeling activities (a) to (d) and
(f) to (h), which depend on the considered step of the 2-step
modeling approach, whereas the latter input information
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Fig. 8. TeCoPS Analysis
originates from process engineering and is modeled utilizing
the event structure of the metamodel (see section 2.2), as
shown in Figure 8 within the activity (0), and is out of
scope of the TeCoPS analysis.
The TeCoPS analysis starts with the bottom-up mod-
eling of different failure combinations as part of activity
(i), which are of concern to I&C engineering. For each
failure combination the effects are automatically analyzed
for all modeled event sequences within activity (ii). Based
on the implemented rules in the knowledge base of the
KBS, the analysis yields the information on either the
successful control of the event sequences, or points out the
deficiencies in the design. The activity of the automated
analysis is followed by the decision of engineering to model
further failure combinations (iii), which would result in
an iteration of the activities (i) to (iii).
Once engineering is finished with the modeling of its
desired failure combinations, the TeCoPS analysis is
completed with a top-down approach, where the modeling
of the failure combinations is checked for completeness.
The TeCoPS analysis automatically selects one I&C
function (iv), determines all involved components in the
I&C function (v), and yields the possible failure combi-
nations, i.e. single, multiple, and common cause failures.
Engineering then decides on whether the proposed failure
combinations make sense as part of activity (vi), so that
these can be analyzed6. This analysis is also comprised of
the iteration of failure combination modeling (vii) and
automated analysis (viii). A further iteration is accomplished
based on the I&C functions in activity (ix), so that the check
for completeness covers all I&C functions, components,
and failure combinations.
When all failure combinations are analyzed, the TeCoPS
analysis is finished and the analysis results represent the
feedback to I&C engineering. As addressed before, the
feedback is composed of the failure combinations, unsuc-
cessful control of the corresponding event sequences, and
deficiencies in the design, e.g. missing redundancy, diversity,
or separation.
The TeCoPS analysis solely concentrates on the I&C
system design consisting of the I&C functions, I&C system
architecture, and spatial layout. In contrast to the FMEA
or FTA, the I&C system behavior is not considered, because
this information is not available before the detailed design,
and contradicts the need for front-end loading.
5. SUMMARY
This paper addresses the challenge of I&C system
design, and especially the analysis of the effects with
respect to the superposition of failure combinations and
event sequences on the I&C system design, for which a
method for the analysis of temporal change of physical
structure within the I&C life-cycle is presented.
Preceding the method presentation is a discussion
about the I&C life-cycle. The IEC 61513 I&C safety life-
cycle is introduced and its structure is adapted to the V-
model, so that the importance of V&V is adequately
considered.
The method for the analysis is two-part and consists
of the 2-step modeling approach and TeCoPS analysis. In
combination, both parts realize the required front-end
loading, so that the design decisions can be verified by I&C
engineering early in the life-cycle. The TeCoPS analysis
simplifies I&C engineering by utilizing the concept of
KBS, which allows for the semi-automated analysis. This
reduces the I&C engineering effort throughout the I&C
system design analysis, which specifically is advantageous
under consideration of the I&C system complexity. As a
prerequisite, the metamodel provides the required formal
I&C system models, including TeCoPS. However, the
analysis results are dependent on the analysis rules as part
of the rule knowledge, which must be comprehensively
engineered.
Examples for the modeling of I&C systems utilizing
the metamodel are presented in the stated references of
the authors, supplemented by the exemplary application of
the overall concept, i.e. the combination of the metamodel
and the method, as part of real projects accomplished in the
plants of the first author’s employer. The positive results
of these applications confirm the applicability of the overall
concept.
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